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This paper will examine the debate over industrialization in Britain following the publication of Arnold Toynbee’s path-breaking Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England in 1884. It will show, on the one hand, how the contention that Britain’s early industrialization had been fostered by a protectionist trade policy became central to the understanding of the emerging school of historical economists. On the other hand, the bulk of the economics profession adhered to Toynbee’s implicit view that industrialization had only been unleashed when the burden of the mercantilist past had been largely swept away or rendered defunct by the growing impact of Smithian economics and steam power. Such differing views over early industrialization, however, soon became deeply entwined in the contemporary political debate over the merits of free trade versus protection in early twentieth-century Britain. The recent economic history of England became a central ingredient in the case for tariff reform developed by economic historians such as Ashley and Cunningham, while the case for free trade in Edwardian Britain relied strongly upon a view of history which emphasised slow economic growth before 1760, the importance of mechanization and the emancipatory effects of free trade rather than the benefits of state control. We can therefore locate clearly the reverberations of Toynbee’s Industrial Revolution in the politics of Liberal free trade versus Conservative tariff reform. This moulded a lasting division between two views of the Industrial Revolution, with the former emphasising individual enterprise and a minimal role for the state while the latter emphasised evolutionary change, the importance of empire, and the beneficent hand of the state. These in turn corresponded to two distinct visions of the British future, a Liberal (and to some extent, Labour) continuation of free trade as the basis of economic welfare and imperial policy or a Conservative wholesale reconstruction of state, economy and empire. While the contest between these rival conceptions of the British industrial past was at its most significant during the Edwardian controversy over free trade and tariff reform, echoes of this debate continued to be heard even in the later twentieth-century historiography of the Industrial Revolution.    
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The timing and chronology of the events most famously categorized by Arnold Toynbee as an ‘Industrial Revolution’ came to play a significant part in one of the most urgent and vital debates in later nineteenth and early twentieth-century debate in Britain, that between free trade and tariff reform.​[1]​ That political controversy counterpoised different views of the state, empire, markets, economic progress, and social welfare in ways that sprang directly from rival historiographical conceptions of the Industrial Revolution.​[2]​  For the contention that Britain’s early industrialization had been fostered by a state-directed trade policy became central to the understanding of the emerging school of historical economists, who, in turn, were among the leading theorists of the movement for tariff reform. Nevertheless, it was equally contended by free traders (including historians), that, as Toynbee himself argued, industrialization had been unleashed only when the burden of the mercantilist past had been largely swept away or rendered defunct with the growing impact of Smithian economics and steam power.​[3]​ At the same time, the thinkers of the growing socialist movement in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain generally combined a pragmatic belief in the benefits of free trade with a theoretical belief that the greater Britain’s prosperity under free trade the greater the degree of relative immiseration of the working classes; that under free trade conditions, industrialisation in Britain had been unbalanced, ‘excessive’ in both extent and social consequences under laissez-faire conditions.​[4]​ This article will therefore attempt to assess the degree to which the historical debate on Britain’s industrialization both fed into, and was influenced by, late Victorian and Edwardian thinking on economic policy, when the policies of free markets established after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 were increasingly challenged by the state-driven ideologies of fair trade and tariff reform. The conclusion will also show how the careers of some later economic historians combined an interest in the history of industrialization in Britain with active participation in contemporary debates on state intervention, the free market, and economic growth.     

Early historical debate over the Industrial Revolution focused predominantly on one aspect of Toynbee’s work, his concern as a social reformer, with its human consequences, the deleteriousness of which was emphasised by the Hammonds and dominated early twentieth-century historiography.​[5]​ In an important essay, Cannadine traced this concern with the ‘terrible social results’ of industrialization to the renewed late nineteenth-century debate over the ‘Condition of England’, part in turn of the growing movement for state intervention and social reform among all parties.​[6]​ Yet, equally Toynbee’s ‘Industrial Revolution’ had put forward an interpretation of that process which emphasised free trade and new technology as its essential features, while also promoting social and economic history as a sphere of investigation in its own right, separated from, if intimately related to, political economy. For Toynbee therefore the Industrial Revolution signified an essential change was from regulation to competition but in terms of method he sought to preserve what was worthwhile in the teachings of orthodox political economy, modifying its principles but not replacing them by the inductive approach of the historical economists.​[7]​ Both Toynbee’s substantive explanation of industrialization and his methods contributed posthumously therefore not only to the debate on social reform but also to a second major contemporary preoccupation with the future of the British economy, at a time the existing free trade orthodoxy was facing an increasing challenge from a growing number of tariff reformers who argued that, in the face of growing foreign economic rivalry and the geo-political shift to competing empires, Britain needed to return to her mercantilist and protectionist past.​[8]​ 
In this context, the early historiography of the newly-invented ‘Industrial Revolution’ was deeply-influenced by the so-called ‘Methodenstreit’ within late nineteenth-century economics, between its ‘historical’ and ‘abstract’ wings, which in turn became central to early twentieth-century public debate over free trade and tariff reform.​[9]​ Often indeed it has been assumed that the division between ‘historical’ and ‘theoretical’ economists neatly corresponded to the division between tariff reformers and free traders, famously signified by a letter to The Times in 1903 by fourteen professors in support of free trade.​[10]​ However, as this essay shows, while differences over the chronology and nature of the Industrial Revolution characterized attitudes towards free trade and tariff reform, they did not correspond simply to a division in methodology between ‘abstract’ and ‘historical’ economists, and in particular, in a way that has been previously neglected, the case for free trade was made by economists with as deep an attention to history as that of their supposed ‘historical’ counterparts. On the other hand, while the distinctive ‘evolutionist’ perspective of the historical economists to Britain’s economic growth did inform their contribution to the tariff reform movement, the polemical case for free trade highlighted a far more urgent appeal to recent history, ‘The Hungry Forties’ of the previous century, rather than the free trade historians’ underlying ‘revolutionary’ explanation of industrialism. 
	Subsequent historiographical discussion of the Industrial Revolution has also continued to focus strongly on the issue of the chronology and pace of industrialization in ways that reflected directly this original methodological paradigm. Thus typically for Hartwell in the late 1960s, the primary controversy remained one between ‘evolutionist’ and ‘revolutionist’ approaches, ‘between those who see the industrial revolution as the unspectacular climax of an evolutionary process, the consequence of a long period of slow economic growth, and those who see a clear discontinuity in English economic history, an obvious turning-point, a revolution after which industrialization proceeded apace, gathering momentum for sustained growth within a generation of effort’.​[11]​ Hartwell cited as representative of the traditional ‘revolutionary’ school Henry de Beltgens Gibbins, while identifying W. J. Ashley as rejecting the notion of an industrial revolution ‘beginning in 1760’ in favour of the view of the Industrial Revolution which ‘did but carry further, though on a far greater scale and with far greater rapidity, changes which had been proceeding long before’.​[12]​ But while both Ashley and Gibbins may be said to have shared a common view of the Industrial Revolution as ‘nasty, mean, brutish and fast’,​[13]​ their differing views of the character of change reflected their significantly different attitudes to the debate over tariffs initiated by the ‘fair traders’ of the 1880s, and taken up with vigour by the tariff reformers in 1903.​[14]​ Gibbins’ free trade orthodoxy had been rewarded with the Oxford Cobden Club prize in 1890, and his research was primarily inspired by the Cobdenite economic historian Thorold Rogers.​[15]​ While an admirer of Ashley and Cunningham, he acknowledged that ‘in some points, I differ’. Those points included his view that ‘mercantile theory’ was ‘a mistake’ but led above all to an emphasis on ‘The suddenness of the Revolution’ during the ‘Epoch of the Great Inventions’, as a result of which: ‘Nothing has done more to make England what she at present is – whether for better or worse – than this sudden and silent Industrial Revolution, for it increased her wealth tenfold and gave her half a century’s start in front of the nations of Europe’.​[16]​  Gibbins therefore combined a revolutionary view of industrial change with dogmatic belief in free markets (‘always better for wealth creation’). By contrast, Ashley rejected the revolutionary thesis of his mentor Toynbee, and his ‘evolutionary’ view of economic change became central to his understanding of England’s past and deeply informed his contribution to the tariff reform debate, in which he became in many ways the leading academic participant, with a widespread influence on its leading protagonists.​[17]​ Ashley’s views centred on the gradual development of the economy with the Industrial Revolution as ‘a new forward step’, building on others going back to the mercantilist regime of the seventeenth century, with a particular emphasis both on agriculture and empire; he looked to the Unionist leader of the tariff reform movement Joseph Chamberlain both to restore a more corporatist imperial future after the ‘Individualist’ interlude but also to promote Britain’s industrial regeneration and social welfare.​[18]​ 
‘Evolutionary’ views similar to those of Ashley were more widely held by those identified as both ‘historical economists’ and proponents of tariff reform. Thus, W. A. S. Hewins, deeply versed in the history of mercantilist thought, also located the genesis of England’s commercial and industrial supremacy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ‘the result of a “happy concurrence of circumstances”, that the political rights and the naval victories which Englishmen had won were no less necessary than their great inventions, their economic policy and their commercial enterprise’.​[19]​ Hewins also strongly propounded the view that industrialization was fostered by state mercantilist policy, and while free trade had been the appropriate policy for Britain after 1846, it had ceased to be so with the rise of competing imperial states which necessitated a consolidation of the British Empire, in a way which presented, he believed, ‘some analogies with the great movement for national consolidation under the Mercantilist regime’ whose object had been the ‘creation of an industrial and commercial state’.​[20]​ Both Ashley’s and Hewins’s parts in the tariff reform campaign were therefore intimately related to their view of the English past and the timing and nature of industrialization, which in turn informed their views of the present state of the British economy and the future of the Empire.​[21]​ 
Nevertheless, the most important exponent of the ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of industrialization was Archdeacon Cunningham, whose ‘national economic’ approach was rooted in an admiration for Elizabethan England,​[22]​ but who took up Toynbee’s concept of an ‘Industrial Revolution’, accepting that mechanization between 1770 and 1840 had initiated a new phase in terms of global change, whose ultimate direction and impact was still unclear after the First World War.​[23]​ Nevertheless for Cunningham, while rapid and violent, the age of mechanical invention was only one phase in a larger movement whose roots were in the ‘long-continued efforts to build up maritime power’ creating the global market necessary to spark off enterprise and invention, while the early eighteenth-century state provided the stability that encouraged capital investment in industry and agriculture. For Cunningham therefore the Industrial Revolution was occasioned by commercial expansion in the early eighteenth century when contrary to the later period of laissez-faire, the Whig commercial tradition ‘insisted on the advisability of managing trade so that it might react on home industry’, a ‘new reading’ of which tradition he hoped might provide renewed inspiration in the early twentieth century.​[24]​ While Cunningham’s Growth of English Industry and Commerce was by no means an overtly partisan account, his footnotes nailed his colours to the mast of Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign as did his admiration for the prospect of a new commercial empire.​[25]​ In his postscript he allowed himself to ruminate on the limitations of free trade, a maxim which had fitted Britain in a particular historical condition but which contained no universal programme for growth; rather, modern states ‘are inclined to imitate the steps by which England attained to greatness, and to try to build up a commercial and industrial system by the protectionist methods she pursued’.​[26]​ In his more polemical writings, but building on his historical work, tariff reform represented the necessary re-imposition of order and control within a new imperial framework after the individualistic chaos of laissez-faire; Cobdenism was to be followed by a re-imposition not only of tariffs but of morality in politics, and order in society.​[27]​ At the same time Cunningham made it clear that ‘The steady development and sudden expansion of industrial activity which rendered England the workshop of the world, occurred under a highly protective system’, pointedly noting ‘That high protection should have been characterised by great enterprise and rapid progress is so entirely inconsistent with the preconceived opinions of some economists’.​[28]​ Cunningham’s was the most comprehensive history of the English economy available at the turn of the century, and his views, as we will see, came to be widely cited by the proponents of tariff reform. Cunningham influenced a large number of studies of the economic history of modern Britain, not least the successful textbook study of George Townsend Warner, a Harrow schoolmaster, author of the popular Landmarks of English Industrial History (first edition, 1899), which combined a due emphasis on ‘the story of mechanical inventions’  with the ‘evolutionist’ caution that ‘To appreciate the main features of this Industrial Revolution’ as it is sometimes called, requires some knowledge of industrial conditions before the introduction, first of all, of machinery, and later, of steam-power, changed the old order for a new one’.​[29]​ On the other hand, Cunningham was not without critics who would come to be identified with free trade in the Edwardian controversy, for example, E. K. C. Gonner, who noted what he considered the excessive importance attached by Cunningham to the beneficial consequences of the mercantile system.​[30]​              
	Hewins, Cunningham, and Ashley, all closely identified with the campaign for tariff reform, were also all firmly attached to the ‘continuity’/ ‘evolutionary’ thesis of the ‘Industrial Revolution’. Nevertheless, at the height of the tariff controversy, there appeared what was in many ways the most detailed and influential history of the Industrial Revolution published in Britain before the 1920s, Paul Mantoux’s La Révolution industrielle au XVIIIe siècle. Essai sur les commencements de la grande industrie moderne en Angleterre (Paris, 1906). Mantoux was indebted to Toynbee’s account but acknowledged inter alia the help of the historical economist, H. S. Foxwell​[31]​ and especially Cunningham, ‘whose classic work was our guide whenever we had to deal with matters outside of our own subject’ ​[32]​ But departing from Toynbee’s outline, he took as his own ground facts rather than ideas, particularly the facts of industrial life between c. 1760-1810, associating the revolution primarily with the factory system: the changes in industry itself, and becoming a pioneering user of business records in this context. This emphasis also identifies him clearly with the ‘discontinuity’ camp, although he was, like Cunningham, also keen to stress the changing nature of capitalist organization in the early eighteenth century.​[33]​ Mantoux’s later institutional affiliations place him firmly in a liberal economic context as one of the founders of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva but he wrote in 1906 as a recent graduate who had spent a year in London at the peak of the debate over free trade and tariff reform.​[34]​ Even so, his work revealed little interest in that debate, nor did his other writings on England, although he did devote great attention to the rise of labour and the educational controversy following the 1902 Act.​[35]​ Professor of Modern French History and Literature at the University of London in 1913, and interpreter for Georges Clemenceau at the Versailles Peace Conference, his later writings included a strongly anti-tariff recommendation of the restoration of liberal trade relations between Britain and France after the ending of the First World War.​[36]​ While the popular impact of Mantoux’s Industrial Revolution was much delayed, coming only after its translation in 1928,​[37]​ it was acknowledged as the ‘first big-scale study of the rise of industrialism’, favourably noticed by L. L. Price (sympathetic to tariff reform) and somewhat more critically, given its relative lack of attention to social experience, by R. H. Tawney.​[38]​ Nevertheless, as a comprehensive single volume interpretation of the Industrial Revolution it was not to be superseded until Peter Mathias’s First Industrial Nation in 1969.       
	 While not for the most part influenced by Mantoux’s account of the Industrial Revolution, those on the free trade side in the Edwardian tariff controversy tended to put forward a ‘discontinuity’ thesis of the Industrial Revolution, along the lines of Toynbee and his followers such as de Gibbins, with an emphasis on steam power, the factory system, and Smithian free market economics, regarding the hollow shell of mercantilism as a drag on progress. Despite contemporary and subsequent views to the contrary, it was not simply the case that ‘theoretical’ economists supported free trade on abstract grounds while the historically-minded aligned with tariff reform.​[39]​ This was not a division between theory and history but between two different views of the English industrial past. Thus supporters of free trade included ‘economists’ who were often expertly acquainted with British economic history, although not setting out to use history as an alternative methodology to that of classical economics. Thus, among the signatories of the professors’ ‘free trade manifesto’,​[40]​ several such as Gonner and Scott, established reputations for detailed empirical historical studies, indirectly, if not directly, bearing on the origins and impact of the Industrial Revolution. Gonner, for example, produced a major but neglected study of enclosure which revised in important ways the conclusions of Toynbee, just as they were taken up and broadcast by the Hammonds.​[41]​ Likewise it would be difficult to find a more empirically-minded historian than William Scott, well-known for his studies of Adam Smith but equally a pioneer of the use of business records and author of an erudite and microscopic three-volume history of early joint-stock companies.​[42]​ But Scott’s pen was also wielded directly on behalf of ‘constructive’ free trade in his pamphlet, Free Trade in relation to the future of Britain and the colonies: a Plea for an Imperial Policy (St Andrews, 1903). Other signatories of the ‘professors’ manifesto’ included Edwin Cannan, best-known before 1914 for his studies on the history of economic thought and that of local rates as well as of Adam Smith;​[43]​ he too contributed directly to the tariff debate with a scorching denunciation of the historical economists, whose attempt to see in government intervention the cause of European and American progress is ‘one of the wildest and most desperate undertakings which it ever entered into the mind of man to conceive’​[44]​. He dismissed Hewins’s [‘Economist’] pro-tariff letters in The Times as ‘the morbid imaginings of one whose ideal of industry and statesmanship is in the eighteenth century’.​[45]​ Among other signatories, George Armitage Smith, a doyen of the adult education movement, had published a historical, if partisan, account of the free trade movement as early as 1898.​[46]​ Charles Bastable and Arthur Bowley also often wrote with a strong historical element, in the former case, in terms of the history of commercial policy,​[47]​ in the latter case primarily through the collection of statistics.​[48]​ William Smart, strongly influenced by Ruskin, rejected claims that he was an abstract economic thinker by reference to his pre-academic past as a thread manufacturer in Britain and the United States on which basis he firmly rejected any idea of a ‘Return to Protection’. ​[49]​ He followed up his polemical attack on tariff reform with a detailed account of economic opinion and policy in the early nineteenth-century Britain.​[50]​ This in what became a classic mode put the steam-powered cotton industry at the heart of the Industrial Revolution, while emphasizing that industrialization in both wool and silk had been ‘checked by protection’, and that ‘from the time of Elizabeth, scarcely an improvement had been made in the process of manufacture’. But it was only in 1820 that ‘Free Trade began to be looked upon as a practical as well as an ideal policy’.​[51]​ 
In addition two significant contributors to economic history adhered later to the ‘professors’ manifesto’, S. J. Chapman and J. H. Clapham.​[52]​ Chapman, another youthful Cobden Club prizewinner, was later better known as an economist and civil servant but at this time was known for his historical study of commercial policy and empirical work on history of the Lancashire cotton industry; the two came together in his influential rejection of Edwardian tariff reform.​[53]​ Clapham, later the first professor of economic history at Cambridge, and the most important revisionist of the ‘Toynbee-Webb-Hammond’ pessimistic school,​[54]​ was in 1903 a recent convert, supposedly under the influence of Alfred Marshall, from political to economic history. Having moved to Yorkshire College, Leeds, he developed a growing interest in the woollen industry. Also a free trade Liberal, this led in 1904 to his intervention in the tariff debate in which he saw no prospective gains from protection for the woollen industries, while ready to aver that ‘the broader the view, the less attractive does the policy become’.​[55]​ Clapham’s subsequent study The Woollen and Worsted Industries (London, 1907) cautiously drew the ‘fiscal moral’ that ‘at times of fiscal controversy there is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of government action... and to underrate the effects of those deep working forces over which Acts of Parliament have but a limited and indirect control.​[56]​ But this ‘moral’ was clearly that of an economic historian, not a Marshallian economic theorist. Subsequently, The Early Railway Age, 1820-50 (Cambridge, 1926), the first volume of Clapham’s trilogy, The Economic History of Modern Britain was also to place him clearly in the discontinuity camp. 
Besides the academic signatories of the ‘free trade manifesto’, a number of other Edwardian economic historians, closely identified with the free trade cause, also held in common the view of the period 1760–1830 as that of an ‘Industrial Revolution’. Thus for Cambridge-trained economist H. O. Meredith the period since the death of Elizabeth had been simply a ‘period of preparation’ when the pace of change had been ‘abnormally slow’. Meredith too emphasised the revolutionary character of change (‘suddenly unprecedented momentum’) with the innovators, the mechanical vanguard, for the Industrial Revolution was ‘the work of a mere handful of men’.​[57]​  Such a view differed significantly from those, such as L. L. Price, more sympathetic to tariff reform, ready, as was Cunningham, to see change between 1760 and 1830 as revolutionary in character but towards which end the ‘mercantile system’ ‘marked a stage in economic progress’.​[58]​ Others, while not participants in the public debate, produced empirical works of history which bore significantly on the controversy. Most interestingly of all, George Unwin had studied in Germany with Gustav Schmoller, the leading member of the school of neo-mercantilism and historical political economy, much admired by Ashley and Hewins.​[59]​ From Schmoller they had taken the view that England between 1750 and 1800 ‘had reached the summit of its commercial supremacy by means of its tariffs and naval wars, frequently with extraordinary violence, and always with tenacious national selfishness’.​[60]​ Yet Unwin returned deeply suspicious of Schmoller’s veneration of the state and produced a string of works which took issue with the historical economists he had inspired. In rejecting the political framework they placed around economic life, Unwin ‘gave a quite subordinate place to mercantilism’ and found the significance of the Industrial Revolution in ‘the growth of a varied and more complex community, embracing an ever-increasing proportion of mankind in a single system of economic relations’.​[61]​ Unwin’s publications at this time were largely on medieval England but he would later turn to the Industrial Revolution, emphasising its entrepreneurial and domestic origins, the product of Lancashire and Yorkshire’s enjoying ‘the advantages of  comparative laissez-faire at a time when restrictions on the creation and free flow of capital were part of the accepted national policy’.​[62]​ Indicatively too Unwin became the model for Sydney Chapman,​[63]​ but those sympathetic to tariff reform such as Lillian Knowles,​[64]​ as well as her mentor (and Cunningham’s co-author), Ellen McArthur, had distinct reservations as to his dismissal of mercantilism.​[65]​   

	Not only therefore were a number of economic historians deeply engaged on both sides in the free trade / tariff reform controversy but their writings and views on the chronology of industrialisation to a significant extent informed that debate beyond the academic world. This was particularly true on the tariff reform side, where as several historians have shown, the ideas of Ashley, Cunningham, and Hewins contributed a central pillar to the argument for tariff reform.​[66]​ Inspired by the historical economics of a this new generation of neo-mercantilists, the so-called ‘Constructive imperialists’ ‘contradicted the orthodox assumption that free trade had been a key factor in promoting Britain’s rise to supremacy as an industrial power’, rather they strongly contended that ‘the Industrial Revolution had taken place under the aegis of a mercantilist state and [that] free trade was a consequence, not a cause of Britain’s success’.​[67]​ On this academic basis, several more polemical arguments were built by tariff propagandists such as Amery and Garvin. This use of economic history predated the reopening of the tariff debate in 1903 and was foreshadowed by those who in the 1890s had first attempted to build a case for tariffs on the basis of growing fear of the industrial might of imperial Germany. Thus the erstwhile Fabian but later Tory Tariff Reformer E. E. Williams, leading contributor to the ‘Made in Germany’ panic of the 1890s,​[68]​ had in 1899 made The Case for Protection which deployed Cunningham’s history to examine ‘England’s Commercial Growth under Protection’, holding that England’s greatness since 1846, albeit a period of decelerating growth, had been based on ‘the preceding generation of Protection’.  It followed that ‘The Era of the Industrial Revolution’ (the eighteenth century) had been based on ‘the steady consolidation of Protection in England in the preceding centuries’.​[69]​
In similar vein, for Leo Amery, one of the key theorists as well as propagandists for tariff reform, ideological henchman of Joseph Chamberlain, it was axiomatic that the case for tariff reform rested on historical foundations, for economic progress in the past had depended on active state intervention, which had culminated in Britain’s industrial supremacy; it was in turn the adoption of free trade in 1846 which had surrendered that supremacy to competitors increasingly benefiting from state-fostered industrialization: ‘the foundations of our commercial supremacy were laid by a process of [consolidating] rigorous State supervision. It is quite a mistake to suppose that our industrial success was simply the outcome of natural aptitude, unlimited and uncontrolled.’ Rather it was ‘the result of positive legislation inspired by a steady determination to establish the maritime and industrial supremacy of this country’. On the other hand, since 1846, ‘the experiment of unregulated free imports has proved a disastrous failure ever since it has had to face a determined and systematic policy of State regulation elsewhere’. Tariff reform however now offered a reassertion of state control and political will necessary to restore ‘imperial strength and imperial unity’.​[70]​ Amery had made essentially the same case in his more substantial theoretical contribution, Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade (1906), examining ‘the most salient features of our industrial history in order to show how they too contradict all the a priori assertions of the free traders’,​[71]​ a survey informed in particular by Cunningham’s history. In this perspective, Chamberlain became a latter-day embodiment of Edward IV, promoting employment rather than simply trade; as in contemporary Germany, state-fostered industries in the English past ‘were the direct creators of the mechanical skill that made England so famous a century ago’.​[72]​ Only with the influence of the leading free trader, Richard Cobden and his followers, was ‘The whole principle of conscious and constructive statecraft working for the greatness of the nation and the well-being and development of its citizens ... abandoned’. Thereafter, ‘For another generation the great machine of British industry ran on by its own impetus, by the intellectual and moral qualities fostered under the old system’. But Britain now faced decline, overtaken by those who ‘have followed, not the example we have set of late, but the example we set in the days when we believed in economic statecraft’.​[73]​    
	Amery acknowledged his debt to Cunningham and List, both of whose arguments were echoed with peculiar effectiveness by one anonymous author, ‘Legislator’ in whose The Coming Reaction he found the epitome of the case for the protectionist origins of Britain’s industrial supremacy.​[74]​ The author of this work was William A. Shaw, better known as an editor and archivist, who had conducted massive research into Treasury records of the seventeenth century as well as sharing with Hewins a rediscovery of mercantilist thought.​[75]​ Shaw’s strongly anti-socialist and pro-tariff case was structured around the belief that protection had fostered all Britain’s vital industries, and that a return to protection was essential to meet the rising challenge of the United States and Germany as it had been to wrest supremacy from the Dutch in the past. Shaw neatly exemplified the combination of exact historical investigation and sweeping imperial economic polemic which became the fulcrum of the tariff reform case. A further example, also largely based on Cunningham’s history is provided by the imperially-minded and Germanophobic journalism of James Garvin.​[76]​ His ‘Principles of Constructive Economics’ were based on recreating the ‘national policy’ which ‘gave us, even before 1846, a supremacy in trade, Empire, and shipping such as the world had never seen before, and far more complete and secure than the supremacy we possess now’.​[77]​ Garvin singled out the importance of statesmen such as Burleigh,​[78]​ the Navigation Laws, and great chartered companies as components of the ‘organic concept of national development as a whole which made mercantile statesmanship great in practice despite all defects in theory’.​[79]​  
	In this way examining the recent economic history of England became a deliberate and essential ingredient of the case for tariff reform developed by its leading propagandists.​[80]​ Nevertheless, the ‘lessons of history’ also required careful modulation in the contemporary context. For example, the tariff reformers’ attitude towards the state retained considerable ambiguity. On the one hand they favoured the assertion of state power in the interests of the nation and empire but they sought equally to reject any interference with private property. In particular it became vitally important to deny that tariffs would pave the way for greater state direction of industry or some form of nationalization: thus Cunningham, wished to separate out the ‘not unnatural reaction from the thoroughgoing application of laissez-faire, which characterised the early part of the nineteenth century’ from ‘all sorts of projects on foot for introducing some system of state or municipal socialism’. Cunningham was therefore deeply sceptical as to the prospects of ‘democratic state socialism’, and believed that ‘the state-organisation of industry has already had a considerable trial in this country, and that the system has been discarded.’​[81]​ In fact it now became a leading rhetorical device among tariff reformers to claim that it was free trade which led to socialism, especially in the wake of the 1909 Budget.​[82]​ In a similar way, the tariff reform interpretation of history paid great attention to the beneficent regulation of labor and wages in the past but sought to argue that any decline in the standard of living was in part the result of the Corn Law of 1815, which they saw as a new, non-mercantilist form of regulation, and in part the inevitable outcome of the relaxation of state regulation of the conditions of labour, as ideas of laissez-faire undermined mercantilist regulation of labour more rapidly than they did the regulation of trade, where the real discontinuity came only with the sudden repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.​[83]​ 
While therefore the historical economists, especially through the influence of the ‘Constructive Imperialists’, provided a cutting edge to the case for tariff reform, by contrast, the rhetorical strength of free trade rested to a far lesser extent on the appeal to the past and far more on the evidence of the prosperity experienced by England since 1846 as well as the perceived threat to that welfare and prosperity posed by tariff reform. Nevertheless, some Liberal advocates did take some care to reject the use of history by the tariff reformers. For example the leading free trader and ‘New Liberal’ J. M. Robertson regularly denied that Britain had achieved manufacturing supremacy before 1846; this he believed was a myth fostered by historians such as Cunningham, Ashley and Hewins, all of whom were ‘openly imperial in sentiment’.​[84]​ Nevertheless, the rejection of tariff reform was underpinned by a distinctive view of the Industrial Revolution, one which emphasized the slowness of growth before 1760, the importance of mechanization, and the emancipatory effect of free trade rather than the benefits of state control. This view owed much to Toynbee although his name was rarely cited by free trade advocates, far readier to draw on the legacy of Cobden than the historiography of the Industrial Revolution. Hence in particular, the popular defence of free trade emphasized the dark days of protection, the ‘Hungry Forties’, a more effective appeal to the still remembered past than the Tariff Reform réchauffé of Elizabethan England or the ‘mercantilist system’. Rather the evocation of poverty in the bad old days of Protection was, in a crude but effective fashion, held out as an image of the world the tariff reformers would restore.​[85]​   
	The ‘Hungry Forties’ proved a masterstroke for the Liberal defence of free trade, while it was also a powerful motif within much socialist rhetoric.​[86]​ But even so, before 1914, a competing socialist interpretation of the industrial past increasingly challenged Liberal orthodoxy.​[87]​ This perspective emphasized the deleterious consequences of the ‘uncontrolled’ pattern of industrialization in Britain as a result of the ideological dominance of laissez-faire. In common with the tariff reformers the Labour Left shared a notion of the crisis of fin-de-siècle industrial society, a reaction against laissez-faire, and a belief in the benefits of the reassertion of state control of the economy. As Trentmann argues, such views owed much to Marx and Engels, with some later influence from Kropotkin. Any direct influence of Toynbee’s Industrial Revolution seems slight, and if anything, it was the Cobdenite Thorold Rogers whose influence was often the greater on Labour’s economic thinking on the past, especially in its adherence to land reform as the means to restore ‘balance’ to economy and society.​[88]​ But the Left’s readiness to promote public control was primarily directed towards the goal of balanced economic growth in the future, rather than simply more effective competition with the rising powers of Germany and the USA. For the most part it advocated the firm rejection of ‘neo-mercantilism’, and of the capitalist demand for tariffs.​[89]​ Yet this did not prevent some sympathy with a constructive imperial policy in the long term,​[90]​ and some socialist voices shared much in common with the Tariff Reform analysis. Thus Thomas Kirkup – who although not a socialist activist was the author of commonly used textbooks on socialism (said to have been a major influence on Mao Zedong)​[91]​ – favoured a major reform of the fiscal system, and like the tariff reformers believed that Britain’s industrial supremacy predated 1846 and ‘was won whilst our fiscal system was Protective’. Even so, ‘the industrial revolution’ occurred in Britain ‘because we were beyond all others at that time a free, progressive and enterprising people’. Yet ‘immoral, and baneful’ freedom from state control had subsequently led to the excesses of industrialization ‘from the effects of which our people will suffer for many generations to come’.​[92]​ Interestingly, among the Fabians, the Webbs, who avoided direct participation in the tariff debate, focused in their writings primarily on the organization of labor and the history of trade unionism. While commonly identified with the Toynbee-Hammond ‘school’, they also clearly saw that the ‘Industrial Revolution’ was the fundamental condition for the emergence of trade unionism. Sidney Webb, too in his earlier ‘Fabian Essay’ had emphasized that ‘the final collapse of Medievalism came, not by the Great Rebellion, nor by the Whig Treason of 1688, nor yet by the rule of the Great Commoner, but by the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century, which created the England of to-day’.​[93]​ For the most part, therefore, socialist thought on the Industrial Revolution fitted into the ‘revolutionary’ rather than the ‘evolutionary approach, although its concern lay in the social consequences, rather than the genesis, of economic change.​[94]​       
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